Limits of US Military Power Need Review

America’s escape from its Vietnam quagmire and the end of the Cold War should have ushered in a more peaceful era for US foreign relationships.  Our Vietnam experience demonstrated the limits of military power in nation building and the Soviet Union’s fall without direct military conflict highlighted the value of other policy tools: diplomatic, economic and informational.

For a brief period US decision makers appeared to avoid openly meddling in the internal affairs of unstable states or in regional conflicts where US interests were weak. The end of the draft reinforced an initial reluctance to rely on the military as the leading agent of US power. Neither attitude lasted for long.

The US has seldom hesitated to insert itself unnecessarily into internal religious and territorial disputes in the Middle East.  In Jon Meacham’s 2015 biography of George H. W. Bush, Destiny and Power, the 41^st president admits that after Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in 1990, the region’s oil-rich sheikdoms were ready to accommodate the Iraqi leader.  Pridefully, Bush explains how vigorously he had to work to get the Saudis and their allies to allow him to create a coalition to kick Saddam out of Kuwait.  While the senior Bush resisted the urge to pursue regime change in Iraq, Al-Qaeda was spawned when US troops were stationed on Saudi soil.

A decade later, the 9/11 attacks led the administration of George W. Bush to deepen US involvement in the Middle East, launching military invasions of both Afghanistan and Iraq.  In the former case there was clear justification, but the rationale for attacking Iraq is still being debated.  In both cases, however, the US eliminated the governing regime, but we have been unable to craft stable replacements.

Obama’s plans for reducing US military forces in Iraq was frustrated by the new Iraqi government’s ineptness and by the rise of the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq (ISIS).  He had no better luck than the junior Bush in putting together coalitions to deal with insurgent groups or civil war.  Where joint efforts were initiated, there have been undesirable consequences. Relying on Kurds in Syria and Iraq has unsettled NATO partner Turkey, while Russia and Iran have taken advantage of the region’s turmoil to enhance their presence and influence.

The sale of military equipment and supplies to Saudi Arabia for use in Yemen has been of problematic value.  Although the Saudis claim to be defending the legitimate government of the country against Iranian supported rebels, their tactics have contributed to widespread economic deprivation in Yemen as well as unprecedented civilian casualties.  Some international groups claim war crimes are being committed with US assistance.

In tandem with activities in the Middle East, the US has aggressively expanded its military footprint in Eastern Europe.  Although originated as a Western military alliance to confront Soviet aggression in the region, NATO has been enlarged, primarily with former members of the Warsaw Pact, its defunct Soviet counterweight. Initiated by the Clinton administration and expanded by both Bush and Obama, the enlarged alliance has been used more as political cover for unilateral US action than as a source of real military support. 

The Russians are of course suspicious as to the real target of enlargement, and much of the American public wonders about the wisdom of US commitments to defend countries like Poland and the Baltic States given their history of animosity towards Russia.  Some in the Obama administration were ready to extend our commitment to the Ukraine as well despite its long standing connections with Russia. So far, the Trump administration has not indicated a willingness to take that step.

Finally, the US also is pursuing a greater military presence in Africa. 

The deadly 1993 fiasco in Mogadishu, the capital of Somalia, in which 18 Americans died in an attempt to capture a local warlord, squelched US enthusiasm for African interventions for many years, but in 2008 the US established an African military command offering training programs to a number of countries.  A major drone base is being built in Niger at the estimated cost of $110 million.  Another drone base already exists in Djibouti.

The cost of a military-based foreign policy are extraordinary and the benefits uncertain.  Military funding is roughly 16-18 percent of the total federal budget and 50 percent of all discretionary spending.  The $600 plus billions the US spends annually is 36 percent of worldwide military expenditures and more than the next eight countries combined.  Seven of the world’s top defense contractors are American and they are responsible for one-third of global arms sales.  A proposed upgrade for the nation’s nuclear arsenal will cost over $1.2 trillion.

Most disturbing is the lack of serious discussion about US foreign policy in the US Congress. The last authorizations for the use of military force from Congress occurred in 2001 (to deal with 9/11 attackers) and 2002 (to invade Iraq).  There should be a national debate about the efficacy of the current strategy and its consequences for our capacity to deal with significant domestic infrastructure needs. Congressional candidates in 2018, incumbent or otherwise, should demonstrate an appreciation of this issue.